Bewley and Kohlberg [1] and Mertens and Neyman [5] have proved, respectively, the existence of the asymptotic value and the uniform value in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and finite action sets. In their work, the total payoff in a stochastic game is defined either as a Cesaro mean or an Abel mean of the stage payoffs. This paper presents two findings: first, we generalize the result of [1] to a more general class of payoff evaluations and we prove with a counterexample that this result is tight. We also investigate the particular case of absorbing games. Second, for the uniform approach of Mertens and Neyman, we provide another counterexample to demonstrate that there is no natural way to generalize the result of [5] to a wider class of payoff evaluations.
Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [9] . In this model, two players repeatedly play a zero-sum game, which depends on the state of nature. At each stage, a new state of nature is drawn from a distribution based on the actions of players and the state of the previous stage. The state of nature is announced to both players, along with the actions of the previous stage. Unless mentioned explicitly, we consider finite stochastic games: the state space and the action sets are assumed to be finite.
There are several ways to evaluate the payoff in a stochastic game. In the n − stage game, the payoff is the Cesaro mean 1 n n m=1 g m . In the λ − discounted game, the payoff is the Abel mean m≥1 λ(1 − λ) m−1 g m .
There are two main approaches to understand the properties of stochastic games with long duration :
-The asymptotic approach aims at determining if the value v n of the n-stage game and the value v λ of the λ-discounted game converge respectively when n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0. Bewley and Kohlberg [1] have proved that in finite stochastic games, (v n ) and (v λ ) converge to the same limit. This result can not be extended to stochastic games with compact action sets (see Vigeral [11] ). It can neither be extended to the case of public imperfect observation of the state of nature (see Ziliotto [12] ).
-The uniform approach analyzes the existence of strategies which are approximately optimal in any n-stage game and λ-discounted game, provided that n is big enough and λ is small enough. When this is the case, the stochastic game is said to have a uniform value. Mertens and Neyman [5] have shown that finite stochastic games have a uniform value.
In this paper we investigate the possibility to generalize these two results to payoff evaluations beyond the Cesaro mean and Abel mean. As in Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin [3] , if π := (π m ) m≥1 ∈ ∆(N * ) is a sequence of weights, the payoff in the π − weighted game is defined as the weighted sum m≥1 π m g m . Intuitively, a π-weighted game with long duration corresponds to the (π m ) m≥1 being close to 0 (but still summing to one), but there are many different ways to define the convergence of π to 0. Once a criteria of convergence has been defined, the asymptotic approach consists in determining if the value v π of the π-weighted game converges when π goes to 0. When this is the case, the game is said to have a general asymptotic value (with respect to the chosen criteria). Likewise, the uniform approach deals with the existence of strategies which are approximately optimal in any π-weighted game, with π small enough. When this is the case, the game is said to have a general uniform value (with respect to the chosen criteria). Two main results can be found in the literature:
-If we restrict ourselves to decreasing sequences of weights (π m ) m≥1 with respect to m, and if the criteria of convergence is that π 1 goes to 0, we find out that finite stochastic games have a general uniform value (and thus a general asymptotic value). This result stems from the existence of the uniform value, established by Mertens and Neyman [5] , and from Theorem 1 and Remark (4) in Neyman and Sorin [6] .
-Renault and Venel [7] consider payoff weights that are not necessarily decreasing with respect to time, and define the impatience I(π) of π as I(π) := m≥1 |π m+1 − π m |. They have studied the limit behavior of finite stochastic games with one Player (Markov Decision Processes) and finite POMDP (Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation), when I(π) goes to 0. In this framework, they have shown the existence of the general uniform value. Note that if π is decreasing and π 1 goes to 0, then I(π) = π 1 goes to 0, thus as far as MDPs are concerned, this second result is more general than the first one.
In this paper, we also give a criteria on the convergence of π to 0 under which the general asymptotic value exists in zero-sum stochastic games. For the asymptotic approach, our result generalizes the two results mentioned in the last paragraph. In addition, we provide an example which shows first that our result is tight, and second that the result of [7] can not be extended to the Two-Player Case. We also show that for absorbing games with compact action sets and separately continuous transition and payoff functions, it is sufficient to assume that sup m≥1 π m goes to 0 to obtain the convergence of v π (when the action sets are finite, a sketch of proof for this last result is written in [3] ). As for the uniform approach, we provide a counterexample which shows that there is no natural way to relax the decreasing assumption on the weights.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we recall the model of finite zero-sum stochastic games and some basic concepts. Section 2 deals with the asymptotic approach, and Section 3 with the uniform approach.
Generalities

Model of stochastic game
A stochastic game Γ is defined by: -A state space K, -An action space I (resp. J) for Player 1 (resp. 2) , -A transition function q :
Except in Subsection 2.2, we assume that K, I, J are all finite sets. The initial state is k 1 , and the stochastic game Γ k 1 starting at k 1 ∈ K proceeds as follows. At each stage m ≥ 1, both players choose simultaneously and independently an action, i m ∈ I (resp. j m ∈ J) for Player 1 (resp. 2). The payoff at stage m is g(k m , i m , j m ). The state k m+1 of stage m + 1 is drawn from the probability q(k m , i m , j m ). Then (k m+1 , i m , j m ) is publicly announced to both players.
The set of all possible histories until stage m is H m := (K×I×J) m−1 ×K. A behavioral strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is a map σ : ∪ m≥1 H m → ∆(I) (resp. τ : ∪ m≥1 H m → ∆(J)). A pure strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is a map σ :
A Markov strategy is a strategy which depends only on the current stage and state. A Markov strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) can be assimilated to a map from N * × K to ∆(I) (resp. ∆(J)). A stationary strategy is a strategy which depends only on the current state. A stationary strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) can be assimilated to a map from K to ∆(I) (resp. ∆(J)). A triple (k 1 , σ, τ ) ∈ K × Σ × T induces a unique probability measure on
π is the game defined by its normal form (Σ, T , γ k 1 π ), where
By the usual minmax theorem, the game Γ k 1 π has a value, called v π (k 1 ):
When (π m ) = (n −1 1 m≤n ) for some n ∈ N * , the game Γ n := Γ π is called the n-stage repeated game, and its payoff function is denoted by γ n := γ π . When (π m ) = (λ(1 − λ) m−1 ) for some λ ∈ (0, 1], the game Γ λ := Γ π is called the λ-discounted game, and its payoff function is denoted by γ λ .
Two results in the literature
Fix a stochastic game Γ. Concerning the asymptotic approach and the uniform approach in the game Γ k 1 π , we mentioned in the introduction two results in the literature. We state them below.
Mertens and Neyman [5] have shown the following result:
which means that for all ǫ > 0, for all k 1 ∈ K, there exists n 0 ∈ N * and (σ * , τ * ) ∈ Σ × T , such that for all n ≥ n 0 and (σ, τ ) ∈ Σ × T , we have
In particular, Γ has an asymptotic value: the sequences (v λ ) and (v n ) converge to the same limit, when respectively λ goes to 0 and n goes to infinity, and this limit is equal to v ∞ .
This result shows that both players have strategies which are approximately optimal in any long game Γ k 1 n . We can immediately deduce the existence of a stronger notion of uniform value (see Theorem 1 and Remark (4) in Neyman and Sorin [6] ): players have strategies which are approximately optimal in any game Γ k 1 π with π decreasing and π 1 sufficiently small. For completeness, we give a sketch of the proof of this corollary.
In particular, (v π ) converges to v ∞ when π is decreasing and I ∞ (π) goes to 0.
Proof. (Sketch) If π ∈ ∆(N * ) is decreasing, then the π-weighted payoff is a convex combination of Cesaro-mean payoffs, by the following formula:
The result follows.
In the One-Player Case, by a particular case of Theorem 3.19 in Renault and Venel [7] , this result can be extended to a wider class of weights, in the following way: Theorem 1.3. Assume that Γ is a Markov decision process, that is, the functions q and g do not depend on the action of Player 2. Then Γ has a general uniform value: for all ǫ > 0, for all k 1 ∈ K, there exists α > 0 and τ * ∈ T , such that for all π ∈ ∆(N * ) which satisfy
In particular, (v π ) converges to v ∞ when I 1 (π) goes to 0.
In the next section, we study the asymptotic approach and investigate if we can also relax the decreasing assumption in Corollary 1.2 in the TwoPlayer case.
Asymptotic approach 2.1 A criteria for the convergence of v π
The first obvious point is that if one removes the decreasing assumption in Corollary 1.2 and only assumes that I ∞ (π) := sup m≥1 π m goes to zero, (v π ) does not necessarily converge. Indeed consider the Markov chain which oscillates deterministically between two states, one with payoff 1, the other with payoff 0. Consider two sequences of weights, one which puts weight on even stages and one which puts weight on odd stages. The difference between these two payoff evaluations is always equal to 1. Thus the condition I ∞ (π) → 0 is not enough to have convergence of (v π ). We are going to provide a more restrictive criteria under which (v π ) converges.
In what follows, for (m, p) ∈ N * × R * + , π p m denotes π m to the power p.
Proof. Let m ∈ N * and q := p ′ /p. By the Mean Value Theorem, we have
and we deduce that I p ′ (π) ≤ qI p (π). As for the second inequality, we have
and we deduce that
Fix a stochastic game Γ, and let v ∞ = lim λ→0 v λ = lim n→+∞ v n be its uniform value. Definition 2.3. Let p ∈ (0, ∞]. The stochastic game Γ has a p-asymptotic value if for all ǫ > 0, there exists α > 0 such that for all π ∈ ∆(N * ) verifying
Remarks 2.4.
-If for some p ′ ∈ (0, +∞], the game Γ has a p ′ -asymptotic value, then it has a p-asymptotic value for all p ≤ p ′ . It is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.2.
-By Theorem 1.3, any Markov decision process has a 1-asymptotic value.
-The Markov chain described at the beginning of this subsection has no p-asymptotic value for all p > 1.
Recall that v λ can be expanded in Puiseux series (see Bewley and Kohlberg [1] ): there exists β > 0, M ∈ N * and r m ∈ R K + such that for all k ∈ K and
with the convention
Note that if p < +∞, then there exists
Now we can state our main theorem.
Theorem 2.6. The stochastic game Γ has a p-asymptotic value.
Proof. Neyman showed that in a stochastic game it was possible to obtain directly the convergence of (v n ) using only the fact that (v λ ) is absolutely continuous with respect to λ, and the Shapley equation (see [10, Theorem C.8, p. 177]). We use similar tools. Let π ∈ ∆(N * ) and r ∈ N. We define π r ∈ ∆(N * ) in the following way:
Let λ r := π r 1 . Let k ∈ K. We have the following Shapley equation (see Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin [3] ):
Let x ∈ ∆(I) be optimal in (2.2) and y ∈ ∆(J) be optimal in (2.5). We have
Combining both inequalities we obtain
Symmetrically, taking x ′ ∈ ∆(I) optimal in (2.3) and y ′ ∈ ∆(J) optimal in (2.4), we get
and thus
Let N ∈ N * . Summing this inequality over r ∈ [|0, N − 1|], we deduce that
With N = N 0 in (2.9), we get
, and the last inequality proves that Γ has an ∞-asymptotic value. Assume now that p < +∞. Using (2.1), let us majorize the term on the right in the last inequality: 
Finally we have
Plugging this into (2.10) gives
Thus for I p (π) sufficiently small, we have both v π − v λ 0 ∞ ≤ ǫ and v λ 0 − v ∞ ∞ ≤ ǫ, which concludes the proof.
The following remarks show that as far as the asymptotic approach is concerned, Corollary 2.7 is more general than Corollary 1.2 and Theorem 1.3.
Remarks 2.8.
- 
Absorbing games
In this subsection, we relax the finiteness assumption on the action sets. An absorbing state is a state such that once it is reached, the game remains forever in this state, and the payoff does not depend on the actions (absorbing payoff ). An absorbing game is a stochastic game which has only one nonabsorbing state. Rosenberg and Sorin [8] have proved the existence of the uniform value in absorbing games with compact action sets and separetely continuous transition and payoff functions. In particular, (v λ ) converges. Adapting the proof of the previous subsection, we prove the following proposition. Proposition 2.9. Let Γ be an absorbing game with compact action sets and separately continuous transition and payoff functions. Then Γ has an ∞-asymptotic value.
Remark 2.10. For I and J finite, this result was stated in Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin [3] , with a sketch of proof. Here we give a complete and simpler demonstration, which holds in a more general framework.
Proof. If k * is an absorbing state, we have clearly v π (k * ) = v λ (k * ), for any (π, λ) ∈ ∆(N * ) × [0, 1]. Let k be the only non-absorbing state of the game, and r ∈ N. In the preceding proof, inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) give
where µ r is the probability that the game is not absorbed, when Player 1 (resp. 2) plays an optimal strategy x (resp. y) in (2.2) (resp. (2.5) ). In what follows we omit to write k.
(1 − λ r )µ r . Taking back all the preceding stages, we get the analogous of (2.10), where N 0 is defined the same way:
Let us majorize the term on the right. The sequence (Π r ) r≥0 is decreasing. Moreover, for all r ∈ [|1,
Because (v λ ) converges to v ∞ when λ goes to 0, the right term goes to 0 when I ∞ (π) goes to 0. Together with (2.11), it shows that the positive part of (v π − v λ 0 ) goes to 0 when I ∞ (π) goes to 0. Symmetrically, one can show that the negative part of (v π − v λ 0 ) goes to 0 when I ∞ (π) goes to 0, hence the proposition is proved.
A counterexample
We construct a stochastic game of order 1/2, which has no p-asymptotic value for any p > 1/2. It shows first that our main result (see Theorem 2.6) can not be improved, and second that Theorem 1.3 does not extend to the Two-Player Case.
Let us consider the following stochastic game Γ: 
The set of states of the game is K = {ω 1 , ω 2 , 1 * , 0 * }. The states 1 * and 0 * are absorbing states with absorbing payoff respectively 1 and 0. The payoff and transition functions in state ω 1 (resp. ω 2 ) is described by the table on the left (resp. on the right). The symbol − → 1 (resp. ← − 0 ) means that the payoff is 1 and the game moves to state ω 2 (resp. ω 1 ). When there is no arrow or star, the game remains in the same state.
In Vigeral [11] , a similar stochastic game Γ ′ is mentioned. The only difference is that in Γ ′ , Player 1 only has two actions, T and B. The uniform
, and in addition the order of Γ ′ is 1/2. Moreover, for all ǫ > 0, the stationary strategy x (resp. y) for Player 1 (resp. 2) defined by
is ǫ-optimal in Γ ′ λ , for λ small enough (they are asymptotically optimal strategies).
As for our example, in Γ λ , the action M is dominated by T in every state. Thus for all λ ∈ (0, 1], v λ = v ′ λ . In particular, Γ has order 1/2, and its uniform value v ∞ satisfies v ∞ (ω 1 ) = v ∞ (ω 2 ) = 1/2. In addition, the strategy x (resp. y) is an asymptotically optimal stationary strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) in Γ λ .
Remark 2.11. Note that if for some α > 0, Player 1 plays (1 − α) · T + α · B in state ω 2 until the state moves, whatever Player 2 plays, Player 1 spends at most a number of stages of order α −1 in state ω 2 before moving to state ω 1 or 0 * , and the probability that the state goes to 0 * and not to ω 2 is at most of order α. Hence for Player 1 there is a trade-off between staying not too long in state ω 2 , and having a low probability of being absorbed in 0 * .
In view of what precedes, in Γ λ the optimal trade-off is α ≈ √ λ.
Theorem 2.12. For all p > 1/2, the game Γ has no p-asymptotic value.
The remainder of the subsection is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2.12.
To simplify the presentation, we first show that Γ has no 1-asymptotic value. Let n ∈ N * . We consider the sequence π n ∈ ∆(N * ) defined by π n m = n −4 if m ∈ [|l(n + n 5 ) + 1, l(n + n 5 ) + n|] for some l ∈ [|0, n 3 − 1|], and π n m = 0 otherwise. We have Let a n (l) := l(n + n 5 ) + 1 and b n (l) := l(n + n 5 ) + n.
The stages in E 1 correspond to the stages m for which π m n = 0. We consider the markovian strategy σ n ∈ Σ for Player 1, described by the following table:
Figure 2: Strategy σ n P P P P P P P P P state stage
We are going to show that for any ǫ > 0, for any n sufficiently large, σ n guarantees for Player 1 the payoff 1 − ǫ in Γ ω 1 π n . Let τ n be a pure markovian best-response to σ n in Γ ω 1 π n . Let Ω n be the event
When the state of the game is ω 2 and m / ∈ E 1 , Player 1 plays B with probability n −4 . By Remark 2.11, Player 1 spends at most a number of stages of order n 4 in ω 2 , and the state goes to 0 * with a probability at most of order n −4 . As a consequence, if for some l ∈ [|0, n 3 − 1|] the state is in ω 2 at stage b n (l)+1, the probability that it will move to ω 1 before stage a n (l+1) is at least of order (1 − n −4 ) n 5 > 1 − o n −4 . Once the state has moved to ω 1 , Player 1 plays M and the state remains in ω 1 until stage a n (l + 1). Hence the probability that k an(l) lies in {ω 1 , 1 * } for any l in [|0, n 3 − 1|] is at least of order (1 − n −4 ) n 3 = n→+∞ 1 + o(1). This informal discussion gives the intuition for the following lemma. Lemma 2.13.
For notational convenience, in the proof of this lemma and the proof of the next proposition, for n ∈ N * , P ω 1 σ n ,τ is denoted by P and E ω 1 σ n ,τ n is denoted by E.
Proof. Let n ∈ N * and l ∈ [|0, n 3 − 1|]. We are going to minorize the probability P k an(l+1) ∈ {ω 1 , 1 * } |k an(l) ∈ {ω 1 , 1 * } . First notice that P k bn(l)+1 = 0 * |k an(l) ∈ {ω 1 , ω * 1 } = 1 (see the table) . Let us now analyse how the state can evolve during the block [|b n (l)+1, a n (l+1)− 1|], discriminating against the case k bn(l) = 1 * , k bn(l) = ω 1 , and k bn(l) = ω 2 :
-If k bn(l)+1 = ω 1 , then Player 1 will play M at each stage m ∈ [|b n (l) + 1, a n (l + 1) − 1|], therefore the state will remain in ω 1 :
-If k bn(l)+1 = ω 2 , then Player 1 will play (1 − n −4 ) · T + n −4 · B as long as the state is ω 2 and m ≤ a n (l + 1) − 1. We discriminate between two cases:
-if Player 2 plays L as long as the state is ω 2 and m ≤ a n (l + 1) − 1, the game will never be absorbed in 0 * , and the probability that the state will move to ω 1 before stage a n (l + 1) is
. If the state moves to ω 1 at some stage m ≤ a n (l + 1) − 1, then Player 1 will play M until stage a n (l + 1), thus the state will remain in ω 1 . Consequently, in this case we have
-If Player 2 plays R at one stage in [|b n (l) + 1, a n (l + 1) − 1|], and if at the first stage he does so the state is ω 2 , then with probability 1 − n −5 the state will move to ω 1 . Then it will remain in ω 1 until stage a n (l + 1). If the state has already switched to ω 1 before Player 2 plays R, then it will remain in ω 1 until stage a n (l + 1). Consequently, in this case we have
The last two subcases show that
This exhaustive study shows that
By induction, we have therefore
and the lemma is proved.
Now we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2.14. The game Γ has no 1-asymptotic value.
Proof. Let n ∈ N * . We are going to minorize γ ω 1 π n (σ n , τ n ) by a quantity which goes to 1 as n goes to infinity.
The last lemma shows that with high probability, at the beginning of each block [|a n (l), b n (l)|], the state is either ω 1 or 1 * . Recall that these blocks correspond exactly to the stages where the payoff weight is nonzero. Hence, to get a good payoff between stage a n (l) and stage b n (l), Player 2 has to make the state move from ω 1 to ω 2 at least before stage b n (l). If Player 2 plays L at each stage m ∈ [|a n (l), b n (l)|], then with probability greater than 1 − (1 − n −2 ) n , the state will remain in ω 1 until stage b n (l). This probability goes to 1 as n goes to infinity, which is a bad outcome for Player 2. Thus Player 2 has to play R at some stage m ∈ [|a n (l), b n (l)|]. We are going to show that:
-either the number of l ∈ [|0, n 3 − 1|] such that Player 2 plays at least one time R in [|a n (l), b n (l)|] is small, and thus the total payoff in Γ
-either the number of l ∈ [|0, n 3 − 1|] such that Player 2 plays at least one time R in [|a n (l), b n (l)|] is high. In this case, with probability close to 1, the state is absorbed in 1 * very rapidly, thus the total payoff in Γ ω 1 π n is close to 1.
Let n ∈ N * and l ∈ [|0, n 3 − 1|], and Ω n (l) be the event defined by
Note that Ω n (n 3 − 1) = Ω n . Let
We are going to show that between stages 1 and b n (l n ), Player 2 did not play enough times R to impact the total payoff, and at stage b n (l n ) + 1, either l n = n 3 − 1 and the game is finished, or he has played too many times R, in such a way that the state has been absorbed in 1 * with high probability. By definition of l n , we have Card M n (l n ) ≤ δn 3 , and if l n < n 3 − 1, we have
We have
If l ∈ M n (l n ) and k an(l) = ω 1 , Player 2 plays L as long as k m = ω 1 and m ≤ b n (l), while Player 1 plays (1 − n −2 ) · T + n −2 · B. As a consequence, if k an(l) = ω 1 , the probability that the state remains in ω 1 until stage b n (l) is (1 − n −2 ) n := α n . Thus the last inequality gives
(2.14)
By (2.13) and Lemma 2.13, there exists n 0 ∈ N * such that for all n ≥ n 0 verifying l n = n 3 − 1, γ
Case 2. l n < n 3 − 1.
Let n ∈ N * such that l n < n 3 − 1. In particular, |M n (l n )| ≥ δn 3 − 1 and
We are going to show the following inequality:
The idea is the following. Each time Player 2 plays R in state ω 1 , the state goes to 1 * with probability n −2 . If k an(l) = ω 1 and l ∈ M n (l), then at each stage m ∈ [|a n (l), m n (l) − 1|], Player 2 will play L, hence at each of these stages the state will remain in ω 1 with probability n −2 . Since m n (l) − a n (l) ≤ n, with high probability k mn(l) = ω 1 . At stage m n (l), Player 2 plays R. Thus with high probability, conditionnal to the event Ω n (l n ), before stage b n (l n ) Player 2 has played more than δn 3 − 1 times the action R in state ω 1 , leading the state to be absorbed in 1 * before stage b n (l n ) with high probability.
First we majorize the first term
If l / ∈ M n (l), we simply majorize it by 1. Assume now that l ∈ M n (l). By the Markov property (σ n and τ n are Markovian strategies), we have
Let P 3 := P(k mn(l) = ω 1 |k an(l) = ω 1 ). The last equality and the Markov property give
If k mn(l) = ω 1 , then at stage m n (l) Player 2 plays the action R, hence the state is absorbed in 1 * with probability n −2 . Thus
, Player 2 will play L, hence at each stage the state will remain in ω 1 with probability 1 − n −2 , and m n (l) − a n (l) ≤ n. We deduce that
Combining (2.18), (2.19) and (2.20) gives
As for the second term in (2.17), we have
Combining (2.17), (2.21) and (2.22), we deduce that if l ∈ M n (l), then
Because |M n (l n )| ≥ δn 3 − 1, by induction we obtain
and inequality (2.16) follows. Now we can minorize the other part of the payoff:
Inequalities (2.14) and (2.23) yield
The sequences (α n ) n≥1 , (β n ) n≥1 and (P(Ω n )) n≥1 converge to 1, thus there exists n 1 ∈ N * such that for all n ≥ n 1 verifying l n < n 3 − 1, we have
Because τ n is a best-response strategy to σ n in Γ ω 1 πn , inequalities (2.15) and (2.24) show that for n ≥ max(n 0 , n 1 ), we have
Because δ ∈ (0, 1] is arbitrary, the sequence (v π n (ω 1 )) n≥1 converge to 1, and Γ has no 1-asymptotic value.
Now we can prove Theorem 2.3.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Let ǫ > 0 and p := 1/2 + ǫ. Proving that Γ has no pasymptotic value proceeds the same way as previously. The only difference is that the sequence of weights (π n ) has to be modified. Let ǫ > 0. Let n ∈ N * , and define two integers N 1 and N 2 by
Let π ′n ∈ ∆(N * ) defined in the following way: for m ∈ N * ,
The proof is the same as before. We still consider the same strategy σ n for Player 1 in Γ π ′n . Lemma 2.13 is still true. Indeed, the length of the blocks [|b ′ n (l) + 1, a ′ n (l + 1) − 1|] is still n 5 . Now let us check the remainder of the proof. The quantity (1 − n −2 ) n 2−ǫ goes to 1 as n goes to infinity.
to get a good payoff between stage a ′ n (l) and stage b ′ n (l), Player 2 will have to make the state move from ω 1 to ω 2 at least before stage b n (l). Thus he has to play R at least one time, and take a risk of being absorbed in ω 1 of n −2 . There are approximately n 2+ǫ of such blocks. Since (1 − n −2 ) n 2+ǫ goes to 0 as n goes to infinity, the same proof as before shows that when n goes to infinity, the sequence (v π n (ω 1 )) n≥1 converges to 1.
Uniform approach
To go further than the decreasing sequences of weights of Corollary 1.2, the simplest sequences of weights one can imagine are the π l,n defined in Remark 2.8: π l,n := n −1 1 l+1≤m≤l+n . As we have seen Theorem 2.6 shows that for any stochastic game lim n→+∞ sup l∈N v π l,n = v ∞ . Is it possible to show for both players the existence of strategies which are approximately optimal in any game Γ π l,n , for any l ≥ 0 and n big enough? We provide an example of an absorbing game where this property does not hold. Thus there seems to exist no natural extension of Theorem 1.2 to sequences of weights which are not decreasing.
Consider the following absorbing game, introduced by Gillette [4] under the name of "Big Match". The state space is K = {ω, 1 * , 0 * }, where 1 * (resp. 0 * ) is an absorbing state with payoff 1 (resp. 0). Action sets for Player 1 and 2 are respectively I = {T, B} and J = {L, R}. The payoff and transition functions in state ω are described by the following table: As any stochastic game, the Big Match has a uniform value v ∞ , and v ∞ (ω) = 1/2 (see Sorin [10, Chapter 5, p. 93] ). The stationary strategy 1/2 · L + 1/2 · R is a 0-optimal uniform strategy. It is more intricate to construct ǫ-optimal strategy for Player 1 (see Blackwell and Ferguson [2] ). Now we investigate the general uniform approach in the Big Match.
Definition 3.1. Let Γ be a stochastic game, and k 1 an initial state. Player 1 can guarantee uniformly in the general sense α ∈ R in Γ k 1 if for all ǫ > 0, there exists N 1 ∈ N * and σ * ∈ Σ such that for all τ ∈ T , n ≥ N 1 and n 0 ∈ N, we have Proof. Assume the contrary: Player 1 can guarantee uniformly in the general sense α > 0. Let (N 1 , σ * ) ∈ N * × Σ corresponding to ǫ = α/2 in (3.1). We denote by y the stationary strategy y := α/10 · L + (1 − α/10) · R. Let A n be the event {Player 1 plays T before stage n}. The sequence (P σ * ,y (A n )) n≥1 is increasing and bounded by 1, therefore it converges to some l ∈ [0, 1]. Let N 0 ∈ N * such that for all n ≥ N 0 , P σ * ,y (A n ) ≥ l − α/10. There exists N 2 ∈ N * such that
where for h ∈ H n , the strategy y ′ (h) is the Markov strategy equal to y between stages 1 and a(h), and equal to j m (h) for each stage m ≥ a(h) + 1. Let h ∈ H n . Let us now minorize P σ * ,y ′ (h) (A N 0 ∩ A N 2 ). If Player 1 plays T at some stage m ≤ a(h) against the strategy y ′ (h), the game is absorbed in 1 * with probability α/10, and in 0 * with probability 1 − α/10. Therefore we have
Because h ∈ H n , we have 
